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CISG ARTICLE 79: EXEMPTION OF 
PERFORMANCE, AND ADAPTATION OF 
CONTRACT THROUGH 
INTERPRETATION OF 
REASONABLENESS－FULL OF SOUND 
AND FURY, BUT SIGNIFYING 
SOMETHING 
Yasutoshi Ishida* 
ABSTRACT 
Article 79 of the CISG provides that “[a] party is not liable for a 
failure to perform any of his obligations” if the party has 
encountered a certain impediment defined therein.  It was once 
depicted as “the Convention’s least successful part of the half-
century of work.”  It has been thirty years since the CISG took 
effect.  However, the interpretation of Article 79 is as old and 
unsuccessful as ever.  For one thing, it has long been interpreted 
against our intuition, not to exempt a party from specific 
performance claims.  For another, the controversy has long 
continued unsettled over whether a party could be exempted in the 
so-called “hardship” cases.  Lastly, where an event fundamentally 
alters the equilibrium of the contract because of the increased cost 
of performance, judges’ power to adapt the contract is urgently 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, Himeji-Dokkyo University, Japan (LL.M., Kyoto 
University). I am profoundly indebted to late Professor Shinichiro Michida 
(Rapporteur of the CISG at the Diplomatic Conference in 1980), who had 
cordially instructed me while I was an undergraduate and LL.M. student at 
Kyoto University. Thank you to the Pace International Law Review Editorial 
Board for publishing and editing this article in skillful manners. Special thanks 
to Joanna Kusio, Editor-in-Chief, for insightfully pinpointing the portions in 
need of clarification.   
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desired, but no reasonable basis in provisions of the CISG has been 
suggested. 
 
This article demonstrates that (1) Article 79 as a rule exempts a 
party from specific performance claims, (2) the so-called 
“hardship” cases are within the ambit of Article 79, and that (3) 
judges can adapt contracts through what this author terms a 
“reasonable expectation test.” 
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 INTRODUCTION 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (“CISG”)1 provides for exemption 
from contractual liabilities in cases of an unexpected impediment 
beyond control in Article 79.  Article 79 (1) prescribes:  
 
A party is not liable for a failure to 
perform any of his obligations if he 
proves that the failure was due to an 
impediment beyond his control and 
that he could not reasonably be 
expected to have taken the 
impediment into account at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract or 
to have avoided or overcome it or its 
consequences.2   
 
Article 79(1) is said to be “one of the most complex and difficult in 
the CISG,”3 and, therefore, one of the most controversial.  For one, 
although at first blush Article 79 gives the impression that it 
exempts a failing party4 from his obligation to perform, it in fact 
has been interpreted to allow for specific performance claims by 
the other party.5  This puzzling interpretation has produced more 
perplexing theories of exception to relieve the failing party from 
                                                          
1 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) 
[hereinafter CISG]. 
2 Id. art. 79(1). 
3 Harry M. Flechtner, The Exemption Provisions of the Sales 
Convention, Including Comments on “Hardship” Doctrine and the 19 June 
2009 Decision of the Belgian Cassation Court, 59 BELGRADE L. REV. 84, 84 
(2011). 
4 In this article, a “failing party” is a party who fails to perform due to 
an impediment, and who may be exempted by Article 79. 
5 In this article, “the other party” is the alternative party from the failing 
party. 
3
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his obligation to perform in certain situations.6  Second, in an 
effort to justify judicial relief in these so called “hardship” cases, 
various arguments have been made that tend to digress from the 
letters of Article 79, which sometimes invoke provisions of law 
other than the CISG.7  These theories and arguments appear to 
have aggravated rather than settled the problems. 
 
In order to enjoy the exemption by this provision, there 
must be an impediment obstructing performance and a causal 
relationship between the non-performance and the impediment.  
The promisor must also meet the elements of what this author 
terms the “four-prong test:” 1) the impediment that caused the 
failure was beyond his control; 2) he could not reasonably be 
expected to have taken it into account at the time of the conclusion 
of the contract; 3) he could not reasonably be expected to have 
avoided it or its consequences; 4) he could not reasonably be 
expected to have overcome it or its consequences.8 
 
Article 79 is an exception to the ancient principle pacta 
sunt servanda, which means that a promise binds a promisor 
because it is nothing less than what he himself has said of his own 
                                                          
6 See, e.g., INGEBORG SCHWENZER, SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER: 
COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF 
GOODS (CISG) ¶¶ 54-55, at 1150-51 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 4th ed. 2016) 
[hereinafter SCHWENZER]. 
7 See id. 
8 Article 79(1) provides that “he could not reasonably be expected . . . 
to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences.” CISG, supra note 1, art. 
79(1). It cannot be conclusively determined whether “expected to have 
overcome” or “expected to overcome” is correct since the verb “overcome” has 
the same form for the present tense and the past participle. The former is 
probably grammatically correct. In this article, unless there is a need to clarify 
the difference, the phrases are used interchangeably. Where the opportunity of a 
failing party to overcome an impediment has continued to be given to him up to 
the time of litigation, he could be “expected to overcome” it. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/3
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free will.9  Thus, the ancient principle is based on the notion of the 
freedom of contract or private autonomy.10  All of the above four 
conditions of Article 79(1) operate to confirm that the promisor’s 
free will has not played any role in the exonerating situation.11  
 
In Chapter I, this article will argue that if the conventional 
interpretation that Article 79 exempts a party only from damage 
claims were to be correct, the provision would not be indispensable 
and Article 74 could operate in its place.  In Chapter II, the article 
will demonstrate that there was a flaw in the discussions during the 
drafting of Article 79, and that leading commentaries are in fact 
compatible with this article’s interpretation that Article 79 
                                                          
9 See Ewoud Hondius & Hans Christoph Grigoleit, Introduction: An 
approach to the issues and doctrines relating to unexpected circumstances, in 
UNEXPECTED CIRCUMSTANCES IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 3, 4 (Ewoud 
Hondius & Hans Christoph Grigoleit eds., 2011) (“From a more general point of 
view, pacta sunt servanda is one aspect of the notion of individual autonomy. 
Under this idea individuals determine the rules governing their transactions by 
consent. It is a prerequisite of the freedom of contract that the rules that are 
consented to are binding on the relevant party as otherwise the agreement would 
be of little more than moral value and the functioning of contractual exchange 
would be endangered. Thus, freedom of contract corresponds with 
responsibility.”). 
10 U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON THE 
U.N. CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, ¶ 
12, at 43, U.N. Sales No. V.11-86558 (2012), 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/clout/CISG-digest-2012-e.pdf (“According 
to several courts, one of the general principles upon which the Convention is 
based is party autonomy. According to one court, ‘the fundamental principle of 
private autonomy is confirmed [in article 6;] it allows the parties to agree upon 
provisions which derogate from the provisions of the Convention or even to 
completely exclude its application with express and/or tacit agreement.’”).  
11 See Hondius & Grigoleit, supra note 9, at 4 (“[I]t is not convincing to 
attribute the responsibility for the consequences of unexpected circumstances 
unilaterally to the burdened party based on the concept of pacta sunt servanda 
because a strict allocation of all exceptional events cannot be based on an 
autonomous act of contractual risk allocation.”); see also Brandon Nagy, 
Unreliable Excuses: How do Differing Persuasive Interpretations of CISG 
Article 79 Affect its Goal of Harmony?, 26 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 61, 71 (2013) 
(“Article 79’s exemption establishes a limit to the no-fault regime inherent in the 
CISG.”). 
5
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excludes specific performance claims.  Four reasons will justify 
this interpretation.  In Chapter III, the article will argue that the 
theory which exceptionally exonerates a party from performance 
when it is definitively impossible is wrongfully based on CISG 
provisions.  The Chapter will also define the word “impediment” 
and the causal nexus between an impediment and a failure.  
Chapter IV will explain that Article 79 is based on tacit 
assumptions shared by parties that an impediment will not happen.  
The article will also advance a “reasonable expectation test,” 
which determines whether to exempt a party by asking whether a 
“reasonable person” could expect the party to take an impediment 
into account, avoid it, or overcome it.  In Chapter V, this article 
will apply the new theory to three types of “hardship” cases 
frequently discussed in past discourses, and will show that the 
“reasonable expectation test” can be utilized to adapt contracts.  
Chapter V will also propound what this author has named the 
“Eisenberg Formula” to be used when a dramatic and unexpected 
rise in the costs of performance radically changes the equilibrium 
of the contract.  In Chapter VI, this article will elucidate that 
judges presiding over CISG cases have been commonly adapting 
contracts, and that the adaptation by the “reasonable expectation 
test” is no aberration. 
I. DAMAGE EXEMPTION 
At the beginning, Article 79 provides in paragraph (1) that 
“[a] party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his 
obligations if he proves [certain conditions].”12  At the end, it 
provides in paragraph (5) that “[n]othing in this article prevents 
either party from exercising any right other than to claim damages 
under this Convention.”13  In essence, paragraphs (1) and (5) in 
combination stipulate that a party is not liable for damages when 
the failure is due to an impediment that satisfies the conditions 
listed in paragraph (1), and that the other party can nevertheless 
exercise other rights, including the right to require the failing party 
                                                          
12 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1). 
13 Id. art. 79(5). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/3
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to perform his contractual obligations.  As Professor Schwenzer 
explains:  
 
In contrast to Article 74 of the 
Convention relating to a Uniform 
Law on the International Sale of 
Goods, which not only excluded the 
right to claim damages but also the 
right to require specific performance 
if the conditions were satisfied, the 
CISG generally leaves the 
promisee’s right to require specific 
performance unaffected according to 
Article 79（5).14   
 
This view is widely shared.15  However, reading Article 79 through 
to the end, we may feel somewhat betrayed since reading 
paragraph (1) makes us assume that a party is exempt from all of 
the liabilities that may arise from his failure and that he is no 
                                                          
14 SCHWENZER, supra note 6, ¶ 53, at 1150 (citing Convention Relating 
to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods art. 74, July 1, 1964, 834 
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter ULIS]). 
15 YESIM M. ATAMER ET AL., UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) ¶ 16, at 1061 
(Stefan Kröll, Loukas Mistelis & Pilar Perales Viscasillas eds., 2001) 
[hereinafter ATAMER] (“Art. 79(5) clearly states that an impediment beyond 
control merely exempts the obligor from paying damages. The contract itself is 
not dissolved by the fact that an obligation cannot be performed in a way 
conforming to the contract due to an impediment, even if the impediment is of a 
lasting nature. Therefore, the possibility to resort to any other remedy given 
under the Convention and especially to make use of a claim for performance is 
not precluded by Art. 79. This rule has been much debated and criticized, since, 
unlike comparable national provisions, it is only concerned with the exclusion of 
the claim for damages but does not take account of the fact that an impediment 
beyond control may cause impossibility and therefore render a claim for specific 
performance futile.”); see also BGH Nov. 27, 2007, X ZR 111/04, translated in 
Albert H. Kritzer CISG Database, CISG Case Presentation, PACE L. SCH. INST. 
INT’L COM. L., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071127g1.html (last updated 
June 6, 2013) (“Article 79 CISG releases the debtor only from damages claims 
by the creditor. The creditor’s obligations to perform remain unaffected.”). 
7
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longer obliged to perform.  However, we end up with paragraph 
(5) that brushes off our expectation for complete exemption.16  
Professor Honnold feels the same way: 
 
The statement in paragraph (5) that 
nothing in Article 79 affects “any 
right other than to claim damages” 
could be read to say that a party who 
is entitled to exemption from 
damages could nevertheless be 
“required to perform” . . . .  This 
conclusion would be inconsistent 
with the basic provision that a party 
“is not liable” when performance is 
barred by an impediment.  In many 
cases an action to “require” 
performance would call for an 
impossibility and in other cases the 
sanctions to compel performance . . . 
could be at least as onerous as 
damages.  There is no indication that 
the legislators intended such an 
absurd result.17  
 
                                                          
16 Denis Tallon, Article 79, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION § 2.9, at 587-88 (Cesare 
Massimo Bianca & Michael Joachim Bonell eds., 1987) [hereinafter Tallon], 
https://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/tallon-bb79.html (“The effects of the 
exemption are described in Article 79 in a most obscure and even contradictory 
way. The title of section IV is of no avail: exemption from what? The principle 
set forth in paragraph (1), which is copied from Article 74(1) of ULIS, is 
worded in very general terms: the party ‘is not liable for a failure to perform.’ 
Paragraph (5), however, is an innovation and appears to restrain the effects of 
the exemption to one remedy alone: damages.”). 
17 JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 
UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION § 435.5, at 641 (Harry M. 
Flechtner ed., 4th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HONNOLD].  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/3
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We would not be as disappointed at the very end and 
realize that the exemption is limited to damages at the very 
beginning if these two paragraphs were to be united: “A party is 
not liable [in damages] for a failure to perform any of his 
obligations if he proves that the failure was due to an impediment 
beyond his control . . . .”18  
 
The gist of Article 79 is that a party is not liable for 
damages if he proves that the conditions described in paragraph (1) 
are met.19  On the other hand, it is Article 74 of the CISG that 
generally lays down the rules on damages: 
 
Damages for breach of contract by 
one party consist of a sum equal to 
the loss, including loss of profit, 
suffered by the other party as a 
consequence of the breach.  Such 
damages may not exceed the loss 
which the party in breach foresaw or 
ought to have foreseen at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract, in the 
light of the facts and matters of 
which he then knew or ought to have 
known, as a possible consequence of 
the breach of contract.20 
                                                          
18 In fact, the 1977 Sales Draft had provided: “If a party has not 
performed one of his obligations, he is not liable in damages for such non-
performance if he proves that . . . .” However, during the review of the draft, the 
committee “after deliberation, retained the proposal to delete the words ‘in 
damages.’” JOHN O. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW 
FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE STUDIES, DELIBERATIONS AND DECISIONS 
THAT LED TO THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION WITH INTRODUCTIONS 
AND EXPLANATIONS ¶¶ 432-37, at 349 (1989) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY]. 
19 Tallon, supra note 16, § 2.10, at 588 (“Paragraph (5), however, 
provides that ‘nothing . . . prevents either party from exercising any right other 
than to claim damages . . . .’ [W]hy then is Article 79 not included under the 
section entitled ‘Damages’?”). 
20 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74. 
9
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As far as damages are concerned, Article 79 might be 
useless because Article 74 could play the role of Article 79.  When 
“an impediment beyond his control . . . that he could not 
reasonably be expected to have taken . . . into account” under 
Article 79(1)21 arises, the impediment and the loss ensuing from it 
should be something other than what “the party in breach foresaw 
or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew 
or ought to have known.”22  Thus, the conclusion that he is not 
liable for damages can be deduced from Article 74 without any 
Article 79 intervention. 
 
Against this argument, the following objection can be 
made, although perhaps it may be an orthodox interpretation.  As 
Article 74 provides “as a possible consequence of the breach of 
contract,” it deals with a breach that has already happened and it 
does not care whether the breach was foreseeable or not.  It is not 
on the occurrence of a breach, but on the “amount and kind of 
loss”23 caused by a breach that Article 74 imposes the requirement 
of foreseeability.  Foreseeability is not required for what kind of 
“event” has caused such a breach and loss.  For example, a crank 
shaft of a mill broke, and the broken shaft was entrusted to a 
common carrier to be sent to an engine manufacturer as a model 
for making a new one, but due to the carrier’s neglect, the 
transport of the model and the return of the new shaft took longer 
than promised by the carrier, causing the mill to be shut down 
longer than anticipated.24  
 
In this case, foreseeability is not required concerning the 
occurrence of the carrier’s neglect but concerning what kind of 
“loss” would ensue from the breach by the common carrier.  The 
shutdown of the mill and the resulting loss of profit was not 
                                                          
21 Id. art. 79(1). 
22 Id. art. 74. 
23 Id. 
24 Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 145. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/3
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necessarily foreseeable because there was a good possibility that 
the mill had a spare shaft.  Hence, the carrier would not be held 
liable for damages in this case.  Article 74 does not require 
foreseeability as to the kind of “event” that has caused the breach 
and loss—it does not care whether it be a traffic accident, an 
employees’ strike, or an earthquake. 
 
However, contrary to what may be the orthodox view of 
Article 74 above, we could interpret it as requiring that the event 
causing the breach must also be foreseeable.  As Professor 
Schlechtriem pointed out, the underlying idea of Article 74 is that 
“the parties, at the conclusion of the contract, should be able to 
calculate the risks and potential liability they assume by their 
agreement.”25  It would be anomalous for the purpose of Article 74 
to say that “in the light of the facts and matters of which he then 
knew or ought to have known,” a loss arising from a breach has to 
be foreseeable, but the events causing the loss need not be 
foreseeable.  The parties should be able to calculate the risks of 
such events at the time of their agreement.  Otherwise, a breaching 
party should not be held liable for damages.  In sum, Article 74 
could in effect exempt a failing party from damage claims caused 
by an unforeseeable impediment, in place of Article 79.26 
                                                          
25 PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, EXTENT AND MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
(ARTICLES 74-76), reprinted in UNIFORM SALES LAW - THE UN-CONVENTION 
ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 96 (1986); see also 
ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 2, at 1056 (“In fact, both provisions [Article 74 & 79] 
are based on the same value judgment: contract parties should only be liable for 
damages caused by risks they reasonably could take into account when 
concluding the contract and therefore also when fixing the price.”). 
26 Yet perfect substitution cannot be made, because Article 79 imposes 
additional conditions concerning the reasonable expectation to avoid or 
overcome an impediment. CISG, supra note 1, art. 79. 
11
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II. EXEMPTION OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
A. Discussion During the Drafting and Views of Major Commentaries 
It is clear that Article 79 is not indispensable to deny 
damage claims in case of an unforeseeable impediment beyond 
control.  It may only perform a subsidiary function to clarify what 
can be reasoned out by the interpretation of Article 74, thereby 
foreclosing potential controversies.  What can we do to save a 
provision of the CISG, a product of marvelous efforts by 
respectable scholars and experts? 
 
According to one of the basic principles of legal 
interpretation, an interpretation which gives intrinsic meanings to a 
provision is preferable to one which undermines its raison d'etre.27  
We must come up with those interpretations of Article 79 that will 
rescue it from sterility.  What degrades Article 79 to a fruitless 
provision is the wrong interpretation of paragraph (5): “Nothing in 
this article prevents either party from exercising any right other 
than to claim damages under this Convention.”28  As pointed out 
above, this paragraph is widely interpreted to retain the right to 
demand specific performance.  
 
Contrary to the conventional view, this author believes 
paragraph (5) does not allow a party to exercise his right to specific 
performance.  Further, the root of “the likelihood that Article 79 
may be the Convention’s least successful part of the half-century 
of work towards international uniformity”29 partly lies in the 
insufficient discussions over this provision during the drafting.  
During the review of the Working Group “Sales” draft in 1977 by 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
                                                          
27 See, e.g., University of Cambridge v. Bryer (1812) 16 East’s 317, 
319 (“[T]he sound rule of construing any statute as indeed it is of construing any 
instrument, whether it be statute, will, or deed, is to look into the body of the 
thing to be construed, and to collect, as far as may be done, what is the intrinsic 
meaning of the thing . . . .”). 
28 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(5). 
29 HONNOLD, supra note 17, ¶ 432.1, at 627. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/3
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(“UNCITRAL”), “the Committee was more evenly divided as to 
whether [a party] should be able to exercise the remedy of specific 
performance of the contract.”30  It decided that the remedy should 
be maintained on the ground that “a temporary impediment would 
cease and at such time a right to specific performance should not 
be precluded.”31  
 
At the Diplomatic Conference in 1980, a German 
representative made a proposal that, in case of a permanent 
impediment, specific performance should not be insisted.32  
Unfortunately, this proposal was rejected.33  One might think that 
this rejection offers a solid ground that a right to specific 
performance is retained under Article 79.  However, it is not so 
solid when we scrutinize the opinions against the proposal.  A 
Russian representative objected to the proposal, insisting that: 
 
 [I]f a seller who had delivered a part 
of the goods was unable, owing to 
force majeure, to deliver the rest, 
[and] if the buyer refused to pay for 
the goods already delivered, without, 
however, avoiding the contract, the 
seller would be deprived, under the 
                                                          
30 Yearbook of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law, [1977] 8 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 56-57, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1977; 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 18, ¶ 455a, at 350: HONNOLD, supra note 
17, ¶ 435.5, at 642, n.63. 
31 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 18, ¶ 455a, at 350 (emphasis 
added).  
32 See SCHWENZER, supra note 6, ¶ 53, at 1150. 
33 Id. (“The German proposal that the wording should make clear that, 
if the impediment were of a permanent nature, specific performance could not 
be insisted on was rejected at the Vienna Conference because it was felt that, in 
the case of actual impossibility, no problems would arise in practice, whereas 
the categorical removal of the right to specific performance could impair the 
promisee’s accessory rights.”); see also DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
18, ¶¶ 17-44, at 604-06. 
13
ARTICLE 3 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2018  12:47 PM 
344 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 2N 
proposals . . . of the right to require 
payment, which was unacceptable.34  
 
There is some difficulty in making heads or tails of this opinion.  
First, an impediment, or “force majeure,” prevented the seller’s 
performance “to deliver the rest.”  Therefore, it should be the 
buyer’s right to require the seller to perform which matters in this 
context.  However, the problem is switched to the seller’s “right to 
require payment” by the buyer.  This example does not refer to any 
impediment to block the payment by the buyer.  In addition, it 
seems to be based on the premise that the goods already delivered 
(e.g., 30 units delivered out of 100 units contracted for) can be 
utilized independently, and that they can be charged and paid for 
separately from those undelivered.  This author could find no 
reason why the seller would be deprived of the right to require 
payment. 
 
A Swedish representative objected that: 
 
[A]lthough a party which was unable 
to perform owing to an impediment 
was not required to pay damages, it 
should not for that reason be content 
to wait until the impediment had 
disappeared.  It had a duty to make 
all possible efforts to overcome the 
impediment and its consequences 
and to perform the contract.35   
 
This opinion also contradicts the language of Article 79, as finally 
adopted.  That the party is in the position “to make all possible 
efforts to overcome the impediment and its consequences and to 
perform the contract” implies that the party is reasonably expected 
to overcome the impediment.  Therefore, we cannot possibly say 
that “he could not reasonably be expected to . . . overcome it, or its 
                                                          
34 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 18, ¶ 23, at 605. 
35 Id. ¶ 25, at 605. 
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consequences.”36  Thus, his hypothetical fails to satisfy one of the 
conditions of Article 79.  The Swedish representative did not have 
to worry about his hypothetical situation, because the party in it 
could not be exempted from his obligation to perform or from his 
liability to damages.  
 
It should be noted that the opinion of the Committee quoted 
above—“a temporary impediment would cease and at such time a 
right to specific performance should not be precluded”37—in fact 
suggests that Article 79 does bar the remedy to require 
performance during a temporary impediment.  After “a temporary 
impediment would cease,” no impediment exists which satisfies 
the conditions of Article 79(1) and the failing party is no longer 
exempt from his obligation to perform.  The opinion conversely 
implies that so long as an impediment persists, the other party 
cannot demand a specific performance. 
 
The leading commentary by Professor Honnold explains 
that: 
 
[T]he broad language of paragraph 
(5) was retained because of the 
possibility that remedies other than 
damages might be needed in special 
circumstances, such as the ending of 
a temporary impediment or failure to 
pay the price for goods received 
when the agreed mode of payment 
was blocked temporarily (e.g.) by 
exchange controls.38   
                                                          
36 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1). 
37 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 18, ¶ 455a, at 350 (emphasis 
added). 
38 HONNOLD, supra note 17, § 435.5, at 642 (emphasis added). 
Professor Honnold himself agreed with the German proposal. See 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 18, ¶ 38, at 606. (“The very slight change 
proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany would make the text consistent 
and prevent abuse.”). 
15
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While the payment is being blocked temporarily by exchange 
controls, the buyer is not required to perform.  After the block is 
lifted, there exists no impediment defined in Article 79(1).  
Therefore, the buyer is no longer exempt, the payment is required 
by Article 53,39 and the seller can require the buyer to pay the price 
according to Article 62.40 
  
Another leading commentary edited by Professor 
Schwenzer also maintains: “Upholding the right to claim specific 
performance where a promisor has gained exemption under Article 
79 is entirely sensible if performance remains possible at a later 
point in time, by repair or delivery of substitute goods, etc.”41  That 
“performance remains possible at a later point in time, by repair or 
delivery of substitute goods” means that after that later point the 
impediment for which the seller has once gained exemption is no 
longer beyond his control and that he can overcome its 
consequences.  In other words, after the point there exists no 
impediment satisfying the conditions of Article 79(1), because the 
seller can “reasonably be expected to . . . overcome it or its 
consequences.”42  Accordingly, the seller is no longer exempt, and 
is required to make repairs or to deliver substitute goods under 
                                                          
39 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 53 (“The buyer must pay the price for 
the goods and take delivery of them as required by the contract and this 
Convention.”).  
40 Id. art. 62 (“The seller may require the buyer to pay the price, take 
delivery or perform his other obligations, unless the seller has resorted to a 
remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement.”). 
41 SCHWENZER, supra note 6, ¶ 53, at 1150 (emphasis added). 
42 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1). 
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Article 46.43  Hence, this ratiocination also conversely suggests 
that so long as a qualified impediment continues, the promisor is 
not required to perform.  
B. Paragraphs (3) & (5) and Four Reasons for Exemption of Performance 
Paragraph (3) of Article 79 explicitly provides: “The 
exemption provided by this article has effect for the period during 
which the impediment exists.”44  It unequivocally enunciates that 
the exemption loses effect when the impediment ceases to exist.  
Apparently, the prevailing interpretation of paragraph (5) has 
bothered to expatiate on it only to conclude what paragraph (3) 
manifestly announces.  Paragraph (3) seems to set out a matter of 
course, because after “the period during which the impediment 
exists” is over, no impediment exists satisfying the conditions of 
paragraph (1).  It is natural that the exemption should lose effect.  
Again, we must come up with an interpretation which gives this 
provision an inherent raison d’etre.  For this purpose, “the 
exemption” provided at the beginning of paragraph (3) must be 
interpreted as “the exemption from the obligation to perform.”  
The nub of the paragraph is that the obligation to perform will 
“revive” after the impediment.  Even if a performance is once 
interrupted and exempted by an impediment, such rights as 
guaranteed by Articles 46 (requiring the seller to perform)45 and 62 
(requiring the buyer to pay)46 will survive it.  In other words, the 
                                                          
43 Id. art. 46. “(1) The buyer may require performance by the seller of 
his obligations unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent 
with this requirement. (2) If the goods do not conform with the contract, the 
buyer may require delivery of substitute goods only if the lack of conformity 
constitutes a fundamental breach of contract and a request for substitute goods is 
made either in conjunction with notice given under article 39 or within a 
reasonable time thereafter. (3) If the goods do not conform with the contract, the 
buyer may require the seller to remedy the lack of conformity by repair, unless 
this is unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances. A request for repair 
must be made either in conjunction with notice given under article 39 or within a 
reasonable time thereafter.” Id.  
44 Id. art. 79(3).  
45 Id. art. 46. 
46 Id. art. 62. 
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failing party cannot refuse to perform after the impediment, by 
asserting that once exempted, he will be exempted for good.47 
 
On the other hand, this interpretation does not apply to the 
damage exemption.  Damage claims should not “revive” after the 
impediment.  The exemption from claims for damages caused by 
the delay during the impediment will last forever.  Otherwise, the 
exemption would be meaningless, or it would only grant a grace 
period.48  The failing party may be requested to perform after the 
impediment and may perform belatedly, but the other party is still 
prevented from making a damage claim for the delay during the 
impediment.49  This interpretation is congruent with the fact that 
exercising the right to claim damages is an exception under Article 
79(5).50  
 
The pivotal question is whether the other party can demand 
specific performance during the period when the impediment 
                                                          
47 See Albert H. Kritzer CISG Database, Guide to CISG Article 79: 
Secretariat Commentary (closest counterpart to an Official Commentary) ¶ 14, 
PACE L. SCH. INST. INT’L COM. L.,  
https://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-79.html (last updated 
Aug. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Guide to CISG Article 79] (“However, if the 
contract was not avoided by the other party, the contract continues in existence 
and the removal of the impediment reinstates the obligations of both parties 
under the contract.”); see also ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 27, at 1065 
(“According to Art. 79(3) the obligor is only exempt from paying damages for 
the duration of the impediment. If in that time-span specific performance is also 
barred since, for example, export from the country where the specific goods are 
coming from is stopped due to a plague, the buyer can only claim performance 
again once the ban is lifted. The performance claim is suspended.”). 
48 This is also true of the damages claims to non-conformities caused 
by an impediment. See ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 12, at 1059-60 (referencing 
applicability of Article 79 to defective delivery). 
49 Needless to say, a failing party is not exempt from the damages 
which he causes after the impediment (e.g., he is procrastinating his 
performance even after the impediment has been eliminated). It is a matter of 
course that such damages should not be exempted, and they are out of the sphere 
of Article 79 in the first place. 
50 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(5). 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/3
ARTICLE 3 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2018  12:47 PM 
2018 CISG Article 79 349 
persists.  As is often pointed out,51 Article 79(5) saves the other 
party’s right to avoid the contract (Articles 49 and 64) and to 
reduce the price (Article 50) by announcing that it does not 
“prevent either party from exercising any right other than to claim 
damages.”52  As stated above, it is also interpreted to allow for 
specific performance claims, and contrary to this conventional 
view, it does not for the following four reasons. 
  
First is the fundamental linguistic reason derived from the 
letters of Article 79(1) itself, which says, “a party is not liable for a 
failure to perform any of his obligations.”53  The CISG itself does 
not have a clause that glosses the terms used in its provisions.  In 
addition, when we are engaged in the “interpretation of this 
Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to 
the need to promote uniformity in its application,”54 and we must 
not resort to the usages of local judiciary.  A commonly-used 
dictionary, such as the Oxford English Dictionary (“OED”), could 
be consulted.  It defines the word “liable” as “bound or obliged by 
                                                          
51 See, e.g., HONNOLD, supra note 17, § 435.5, at 642, n.64 (“The 
language that became CISG 79(5) was prepared during UNCITRAL’s 1977 
review (in a Committee of the Whole) of the Working Group Draft. There was 
‘general agreement that’ [under this provision the party expecting performance] 
‘should have the right to avoid the contract if the failure to perform amounted to 
a fundamental breach’ and that ‘he should have the right to reduce the price in 
appropriate circumstances.’ (This right would be appropriate if the seller, after 
an excused delay, delivered defective goods.))”; see also DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 18, ¶ 455a, at 350; SCHWENZER, supra note 6, ¶¶ 56-57, at 
1151-52.  
52 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(5); see also id. arts. 49, 64; see also id. 
art. 50 (“If the goods do not conform with the contract and whether or not the 
price has already been paid, the buyer may reduce the price in the same 
proportion as the value that the goods actually delivered had at the time of the 
delivery bears to the value that conforming goods would have had at that time. 
However, if the seller remedies any failure to perform his obligations in 
accordance with article 37 or article 48 or if the buyer refuses to accept 
performance by the seller in accordance with those articles, the buyer may not 
reduce the price.”).  
53 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1). 
54 Id. art. 7(1). 
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law or equity, or in accordance with a rule or convention.”55  A 
“failure to perform” means that the party has not performed.  
Hence, Article 79(1) says a party is not “bound or obliged” to 
perform any of his obligations under the contract even if he has not 
performed when he has encountered an impediment defined.  It 
would not make any sense at all if a provision were to read: “A 
party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations 
and yet is bound to perform it.”  
 
There is more to buttress this conclusion.  That is, 
paragraph (1) of Article 79 governs all four paragraphs following 
it.  Paragraph (2) relies on paragraph (1) for its definition (“he is 
exempt under the preceding paragraph”); the word “exemption 
provided by this article” in paragraph (3) is the exemption in 
paragraph (1); and the “impediment” in paragraph (4) is the 
impediment defined in paragraph (1).56  Therefore, the clear 
command of paragraph (1) that a “party is not liable for a failure to 
perform” infiltrates down to paragraph (5).57  Paragraph (5) retains 
only those remedies which are consistent with forbearance of 
claiming specific performances (i.e., avoidance of contract and 
reduction of price).  It is antiparallel to Article 46(1), which 
provides: “The buyer may require performance by the seller of his 
obligations unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is 
                                                          
55 Liable, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). 
56 Id. art. 79(1)-(4). 
57 Article 38 can be spotlighted as another example that illustrates that 
paragraph (1) functions as a general provision for the following paragraphs. 
Article 38(1) provides: “The buyer must examine the goods, or cause them to be 
examined, within as short a period as is practicable in the circumstances.” The 
effect of paragraph (1) is acting on paragraph (2), which provides: “If the 
contract involves carriage of the goods, examination may be deferred until after 
the goods have arrived at their destination.” The deferred examination after 
arriving at the new destination does not have to be made as soon as possible, but 
can be made “within as short a period as is practicable in the circumstances.” 
The same is true of paragraph (3). See Yasutoshi Ishida, CISG Art. 38 & 39 and 
Japanese Commercial Code Article 526―Examination of Goods and Notice of 
Non-conformity: “One Month No Prejudice” Test, 56 HIMEJI L. REV. 1, 6-7 
(2015) (citing CISG, supra note 1, art. 38).  
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inconsistent with this requirement.”58  The “remedy” mentioned in 
this provision is the same as “any right” mentioned in Article 
79(5), i.e., avoidance and reduction of the price.59  Thus, Article 
46(1) clearly reveals that the right to avoid contract and to reduce 
price are “inconsistent with” the requirement of performance. 
 
Third, even if a failing party were to be required to perform 
while the impediment continued, there would be virtually no 
remedy for the other party to resort to if the failing party refused.  
In all probability, he will refuse, but so long as the conditions of 
Article 79(1) are satisfied, no damages can be claimed for his 
refusal to perform.  Domestic laws may have various provisions to 
enforce performance.  However, they are subject to Article 28 of 
the CISG,60 and they might be inconsistent with the damage 
exemption.  In addition, it is doubtful whether their efficacy is 
worthy of the litigation costs involved in the international context.  
Therefore, the retention of the right to claim performance is 
illusory, without any enforceable endorsement. 
    
Lastly, it is simply “unreasonable” to force a failing party 
to perform while a qualified impediment continues.  When a 
failing party is exempt under Article 79(1), there is an impediment 
which “he could not reasonably be expected to have . . . 
overcome.”61  Forcing him to overcome what he could not 
                                                          
58 CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(1) (emphasis added). 
59 See Guide to CISG Article 79, supra note 47. 
60 CISG, supra note 1, art. 28 (“If, in accordance with the provisions of 
this Convention, one party is entitled to require performance of any obligation 
by the other party, a court is not bound to enter a judgement for specific 
performance unless the court would do so under its own law in respect of similar 
contracts of sale not governed by this Convention.”). 
61 Id. art. 79(1). 
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reasonably be expected to overcome is clearly unreasonable, and 
even folderol.62  
III. DEFINITIVE IMPOSSIBILITY AND A CAUSAL NEXUS WITH 
IMPEDIMENT 
A. Definitive Impossibility 
Even those who maintain that Article 79(5) allows for 
specific performance claims concede that, as an exception, they are 
precluded in case of definitive impossibility, such as a permanent 
ban on the import of the contracted goods.  That is, although 
Article 79(5) admits specific performance claims as a rule, it does 
not when the performance is rendered totally, physically, and 
definitively impossible, because a claim for specific performance 
in such a case would be meaningless.  Professor Tallon explains: 
 
The restrictive interpretation of 
paragraph (5) according to which the 
defaulting party is exempted only 
from liability for damages -- is least 
acceptable when the non-
performance is total and 
definitive. . . .  The right of the 
injured party to claim specific 
performance or avoidance does not 
make sense any more.  Specific 
performance is, by definition, 
impossible.63    
                                                          
62 See Harry Flechtner, Article 79 of the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) as Rorschach Test: The 
Homeward Trend and Exemption for Delivering Non-Conforming Goods, 19 
PACE INT’L L. REV. 29, 43 (2007) (“But how can a party be forced to perform 
when it has shown, as required for exemption under Article 79, that an 
impediment has rendered its performance impossible (or, at the very least, so 
extraordinarily difficult as to satisfy the very strict standard for exemption)?”). 
63 Tallon, supra note 16, § 2.10.2, at 589-90. 
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Professor Atamer points out this conclusion is drawn from 
provisions other than that of Article 79(5).  She argues that, 
regardless of an impediment, the question of whether a specific 
performance claim is granted or not should be governed by the 
provisions specifically addressing performance: 
Even if the obligor is responsible for 
e.g. the loss of any specific goods as 
there was a foreseeable and 
controllable impediment, or even if 
he has intentionally destroyed these 
goods, a claim for specific 
performance cannot be granted.  The 
existence of a performance claim is 
independent from the fact of whether 
non-performance can be imputed to 
the obligor or not.  Therefore, it is 
not correct to search under Art. 79 
for an answer to the question of 
whether specific performance can 
still be claimed.  This question has to 
be answered by looking at Arts 46 
and 62, which are the main 
provisions regarding the remedy of 
specific performance.64  
Perhaps Professor Atamer is right when she says that “it is 
not correct to search under Art. 79.”65  However, following her 
instruction and searching Article 46(1), all we find is: “The buyer 
may require performance by the seller of his obligations unless the 
buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this 
requirement.”66   As explained in Section B of Chapter II above, the 
“unless” clause is designed for such a case as where the buyer has 
                                                          
64 ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 18, at 1062. 
65 Id. 
66 CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(1). 
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declared the contract avoided or has reduced the price.67  The 
clause does not seem to connote the idea that specific performance 
is unavailable where it is impossible.  One interpretation, however, 
explains: “[T]he limit to the specific performance claim can be 
deduced from Art. 46(1) itself since it blocks such a claim 
whenever it is ‘inconsistent’ with another remedy the obligee has 
resorted to. To claim the impossible is inconsistent with the 
specific performance claim itself.”68  
 
This interpretation is wrong.  The “unless” clause of Article 
46(1) says, “the buyer has resorted to a remedy [X] which is 
inconsistent with this requirement [Y].”  When we say “X is 
inconsistent with Y,” X and Y are different things independent of 
each other.  So, “a remedy [X]” in the “unless” clause must be a 
remedy other than “this requirement,” i.e., the requirement of 
specific performance [Y].  In this respect, the first sentence quoted 
above appears to maintain consistency in saying, “whenever it [Y 
= such a claim = specific performance claim] is ‘inconsistent’ with 
another remedy [X] . . . .”  In the second sentence, however, this 
“another remedy [X]” is transformed into “the specific 
performance claim [Y],” the very same remedy.  This self-
contradiction is a product of the result-orientated efforts to forcibly 
inject the impossibility theory into Article 46(1).  Admittedly, this 
provision is meant for an inconsistent situation where, for example, 
“the buyer declares the contract avoided (e.g., ‘I avoid: Don’t ship 
the goods’) and later demands performance: ‘Ship the goods.’”69  It 
is equally wrong to search within Article 46. 
 
We need not invoke a provision of the CISG to say “it is 
impossible to perform what is impossible to perform.”  It is not so 
much a matter of legal interpretation as a matter of course that 
what cannot be done cannot be done.  A contrary assertion would 
be irrational.  For instance, it would ruin the integrity of the CISG 
                                                          
67 See Guide to CISG Article 79, supra note 47. 
68 ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 34, at 1067 (citing the works by Dr. Ivo 
Bach & Düchs). 
69 HONNOLD, supra note 17, § 282.1, at 411. 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/3
ARTICLE 3 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2018  12:47 PM 
2018 CISG Article 79 355 
if one of its provisions were to provide that “the buyer may require 
the seller to perform even if it is impossible.”  Every law is based 
on some axioms even though it does not expressly provide for 
them. That we cannot perform the impossible is such an axiom.70 
 
The arguments on impossibility, although dwelt upon 
above, are in fact unnecessary for the new theory that Article 79 
does bar specific performance claims.  Impossible or not, 
performance is excused if the conditions of Article 79 are met.  In 
other words, Article 79 is not a provision for a case where 
performance has become impossible.  Performance need not 
become definitively impossible for a party to enjoy exemption.71  
All it requires is that “the failure was due to an impediment.”72  
Even when the performance is still possible, a party might fail to 
perform simply because the performance becomes very difficult or 
onerous due to an impediment. 
 
It is now time to discuss the rudimentary question of when 
a party is exempted from performance and damage claims.   
B. Impediment and a Causal Nexus 
Article 79(1) requires the failure to be “due to an 
impediment.”73  As such, it is necessary to clarify what “an 
                                                          
70 Article 82(1) provides that the “buyer loses the right to declare the 
contract avoided . . . if it is impossible for him to make restitution of the goods 
substantially in the condition in which he received them.” CISG, supra note 1, 
art. 82(1).  Professor Atamer refers to Article 82 as one of the two provisions of 
CISG using the term ‘impossibility’ and explains that its “underlying ratio is that 
the impossible cannot be delivered.” See ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 34, at 1067-
68. 
71 Albert H. Kritzer CISG Database, CISG-AC Opinion No. 7, 
Exemption of Liability for Damages under Article 79 of the CISG, op. 3.1, 
PACE L. SCH. INST. INT’L COM. L., https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-
AC-op7.html (last updated Apr. 7, 2008) [hereinafter AC Opinion] (“The 
language of Article 79 does not expressly equate the term ‘impediment’ with 
an event that makes performance absolutely impossible.”). 
72 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1). 
73 Id. (emphasis added). 
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impediment” actually means in this provision.  The phrase was 
deliberately chosen to avoid “the use of various familiar domestic 
legal terms—such as force majeure, wegfall der 
geschäftsgrundlage, eccessiva onerosità sopravvenuta, 
impossibility, and impracticability—in favor of ‘terminology 
neutrality.’”74  Therefore, again, it would be best to consult the 
OED to search for a definition not tainted by local legal usages.  
The OED defines an “impediment” as “something that impedes, 
hinders, or obstructs.”75  A so-called “hardship” situation, which 
will be discussed later in Section A of Chapter V, is qualified as an 
impediment according to this definition.76  One might suspect that 
a simple definition of a dictionary such as this will not work as an 
interpretive criterion for a provision of the Convention.  It will, 
however, suffice because exhaustive modifiers following the word, 
such as “beyond his control” and “not reasonably be expected . . . 
to have avoided,” function as an elaborate annotation of “an 
impediment” and tailor the ambit of the word more narrowly than 
any other possible definition.77 
 
 The same is true of the phrase “due to” in Article 79(1).78  
According to the OED, “due to” has the same meaning as “owing 
to,” which is defined as “caused by.”79  If paraphrased, “the failure 
was due to an impediment” becomes “the failure was caused by an 
impediment.”  Therefore, Article 79(1) requires a causal 
relationship between the failure and the impediment.  If the “due 
to” connotes a “but for” nexus, almost everything can be “due to 
                                                          
74 Nagy, supra note 11, at 64. 
75 Impediment, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
76 ROLF KOFOD, HARDSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL SALES CISG AND THE 
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES 3.1.2 (Univ. of Copenhagen-Faculty of Law ed. 2011), 
https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/kofod.html (“By avoiding reference 
to hardship or any other similar concept such as force majeure, frustration or 
wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, the term ‘impediment’ manages to summarise 
these principles under one provision by a rather elastic wording.”). 
77 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1). 
78 Id. 
79 Due to, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989); owing to, 
supra.  
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an impediment.”  For instance, a seller was absorbed in checking 
the latest news of a big earthquake, which took place in a 
neighboring province, and forgot to reserve a ship for the 
transportation of the contracted goods, causing the delivery to be 
delayed.  “But for” the earthquake, the delivery would not have 
been delayed.  If “due to” connotes a nexus similar to the 
“proximate cause” used in tort law, it may confine the range of 
relevant impediments within some intelligible instances.  However, 
a quest for an appropriate level of nexus is unnecessary, because 
whatever the level may be, the exhaustive modifiers of “an 
impediment” enumerated in Article 79(1) will adequately tailor 
qualified impediments in terms of causal relationship, as well.  For 
example, in our forgetful seller hypothetical above, we cannot 
possibly say that “he could not reasonably be expected . . . to have 
avoided . . . its consequences”80 (i.e., his absorption into the news 
of the earthquake and the delayed delivery), and hence he is not 
exempted. 
IV. TACIT ASSUMPTIONS AND THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION TEST 
A. Shared Tacit Assumptions 
When parties negotiate for and conclude a contract, both 
share many tacit assumptions.  They may vary from “the sun will 
rise tomorrow again” to “the crude oil price will be steady during 
the one-month life of the contract.”  They are a part of a contract in 
that the parties would not have made the contract or would have 
agreed otherwise if they had been fully aware that the assumed 
situations would not come about (“the sun will not rise tomorrow” 
or “the crude oil price will sky-rocket in a month”).  They are basic 
conditions of a contract, but are simply too basic to merit attention 
or mention.  Professor Eisenberg reminds us of what we may have 
somewhere in the back of our mind: 
 
Shared tacit assumptions . . . are just 
as much a part of a contract as 
                                                          
80 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1). 
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explicit terms, so that where the risk 
of an unexpected circumstance 
would have been shifted away from 
the promisor if the assumption had 
been made explicit, an otherwise 
identical shared tacit assumption 
should operate in the same way.  
 
This approach to shared tacit 
assumptions is an application of the 
usual hypothetical-contract 
methodology, under which 
unspecified terms are usually 
determined on the basis of what the 
contracting parties probably would 
have agreed to if they had addressed 
the relevant issue.81 
 
The notion of shared tacit assumptions has much to do with 
Article 79.  The Article comes into play when parties had 
commonly assumed the non-occurrence of an impediment at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract but it did, in fact, happen.  
The very reason why a failing party is exempt is that he and the 
other party would not have made a contract or would have agreed 
otherwise if they had actually foreseen an impediment and 
explicitly addressed the issue.  
 
However, Article 79(1) focuses on the tacit assumption 
only of the failing party (not of the other party), and it demands 
reasonableness for not having assumed or foreseen the 
impediment, and for not taking measures to avoid or overcome the 
impediment.  The tacit assumption of the other party is inferred by 
the “reasonable expectation test,” which will be considered next. 
                                                          
81 Melvin Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 207, 214 (2009). 
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B. The Reasonable Expectation Test 
In defining a qualified impediment, Article 79(1) uses a 
unique phrase: “could not reasonably be expected to have . . . .”82  
In all of the provisions of the CISG, the word “reasonable” is used 
34 times, while “reasonably” is used twice.83  It can safely be said 
that reasonableness has a status as one of “the general principles” 
on which the Convention is based.84  It may be a universal legal 
criterion.  However, it is a highly context-dependent concept, and 
we must consider its meaning in the context of the CISG and 
Article 79.  Article 8, a general provision governing the 
interpretation of statements and conduct of parties, sheds light on 
the connotation.  Article 8(2) provides that “statements made by 
and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the 
understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the 
other party would have had in the same circumstances.”85  This 
provision formulates a so-called “reasonable person” standard.  
The standard is applicable to Article 79 situations because whether 
a party could reasonably be expected to do X depends on the 
interpretation of his conduct.86  Paragraph (3) facilitates the 
determination of the “reasonable person’s” understanding by 
providing, “[i]n determining the intent of a party or the 
understanding a reasonable person would have had, due 
consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the 
case including the negotiations, any practices which the parties 
                                                          
82 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1) (emphasis added).  
83 The word “unreasonable” is used 13 times. See generally id. 
84 See id. art. 7(2); see also Albert H. Kritzer CISG Database, 
Reasonableness: Overview comments, PACE L. SCH. INST. INT’L COM. L., 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071127g1.html (last updated Jan. 23, 2001). 
85 CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(2). 
86 In fact, ULIS in Article 74 entitled “Exemption” explicitly adopted a 
“reasonable person” standard. It provides that a party can prove the intention of 
the parties not to be bound in case of an impediment, and that “in the absence of 
any expression of the intention of the parties, regard shall be had to what 
reasonable persons in the same situation would have intended.” ULIS, supra 
note 14, art. 74 (emphasis added). 
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have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent 
conduct of the parties.”87 
 
If we incorporate the “reasonable person” standard of 
Article 8 into Article 79, we end up with the following test: 
“whether a reasonable person in the shoes of the [failing party], 
under the actual circumstances at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract and taking into account trade practices”88 could expect the 
failing party to have taken the impediment into account or to have 
avoided or overcome it or its consequences.  This article calls this 
the “reasonable expectation test,” and refers to a reasonable person 
described therein simply as a “reasonable person.” 
V. THE SO-CALLED “HARDSHIP” CASES AND ADAPTATION BY THE 
REASONABLE EXPECTATION TEST 
A. The So-called “Hardship” Cases 
Past discussions on Article 79 are based on the preposition 
that in principle it allows for specific performance claims.89  It 
would be better here to test our new theory, which denies specific 
performance claims, by applying it to hypotheticals utilized in the 
past discourses.  The most formidable controversy has been 
focused on the so-called “hardship” cases.  According to 
Professor Lindstrom, “[t]he question whether situations of hardship 
                                                          
87 CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(3). 
88 SCHWENZER, supra note 6, ¶ 14, at 1134. 
89 But see Ingeborg Schwenzer, Wider Perspective: Force Majeure and 
Hardship in International Sales Contracts, 39 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. 
REV. 709, 720 (2009) (“[N]owadays it seems to be undisputed that, wherever the 
right to claim performance would undermine the obligor’s exemption, 
performance cannot be demanded as long as the impediment exists. This rule not 
only applies, for example, to cases of actual impossibility of performance, but 
also to cases of hardship.”). 
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are governed by Article 79 is one of the most difficult and most 
discussed questions concerning the Article.”90  
 
The CISG itself does not have any provision concerning 
“hardship” situations.  The UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (“UNIDROIT Principles”)91 in Article 6.2.2 
defines hardship in the following way: 
 
There is hardship where the 
occurrence of events fundamentally 
alters the equilibrium of the contract 
either because the cost of a party’s 
performance has increased or 
because the value of the performance 
a party receives has diminished, and 
(a) the events occur or become 
known to the disadvantaged party 
after the conclusion of the contract; 
(b) the events could not reasonably 
have been taken into account by the 
disadvantaged party at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract; (c) the 
events are beyond the control of the 
disadvantaged party; and (d) the risk 
of the events was not assumed by the 
disadvantaged party. 92 
 
                                                          
90 Niklas Lindström, Changed Circumstances and Hardship in the 
International Sale of Goods, NORDIC J. COM. L. 1, 12 (2006), 
http://njcl.dk/articles/2006-1/commentary1.pdf. 
91 See generally Amin Dawwas, Alteration of the Contractual 
Equilibrium Under the UNIDROIT Principles, PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE 
COMPANION, Dec. 2010, at 1. 
92 Int’l Inst. for the Unification of Priv. L. [UNIDROIT], UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010, art. 6.2(2) (Dec. 2, 
2013), 
https://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/integralver
sionprinciples2010-e.pdf. 
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Article 6.2.3 provides for the effects of hardship.  It 
authorizes the disadvantaged party to request renegotiation of the 
other party, and for the court to terminate the contract or adapt it 
with a view to restoring its equilibrium.93 
 
During the review of the Working Group  
“Sales” draft in 1977 by United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), an article governing 
hardship situations was proposed.  It stated: 
 
If, as a result of special events which 
occurred after the conclusion of the 
contract and which could not have 
been foreseen by the parties, the 
performance of its stipulations 
results in excessive difficulties or 
threatens either party with 
considerable damage, any party so 
affected has a right to claim an 
adequate amendment of the contract 
or its termination.94  
 
This would have enabled a party facing hardship to modify 
or terminate the contract in a manner similar to that prescribed by 
                                                          
93 Id. art. 6.2.3. Art. 6.2.3 provides: 
(1) In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to request 
renegotiations. The request shall be made without undue delay and shall indicate 
the grounds on which it is based.   
(2) The request for renegotiation does not in itself entitle the disadvantaged 
party to withhold performance. 
(3) Upon failure to reach agreement within a reasonable time either party may 
resort to the court.  
(4) If the court finds hardship it may, if reasonable,  
(a) terminate the contract at a date and on terms to be fixed; or  
(b) adapt the contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium. Id. 
94 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 18, ¶ 458, at 350. 
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the UNIDROIT Principles.  However, the “Committee did not 
retain this proposal.”95  
 
It is suggested that this rejection of the proposal attests that 
CISG has no room for “hardship” cases.96  However, “such history 
evidences that the discussions were not conclusive on this 
question,”97 and the rejection is susceptible to various 
interpretations.   
 
To logically interpret Article 79, it should be discouraged 
to discuss whether the Article is applicable to a “hardship” cases.  
Unlike the UNIDROIT Principles, the CISG does not have a 
provision defining “hardship” situations.98  If we attempt to 
delineate a hardship for the purpose of applying Article 79, it is 
likely to become over-inclusive and under-inclusive, as compared 
to the ambit of Article 79.  In other words, “[w]herever one cuts 
the seamless web there will be loose ends,”99 and short ends.  Even 
if a case governed by the CISG happens to fit the definition of 
Article 6.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles, such remedies as 
provided in Article 6.2.3 are not readily available under the CISG.  
Therefore, we should directly discuss whether an obstacle involved 
in a specific case, which might or might not fall in a so-called 
“hardship” situation, as defined in Article 6.2.2, should be 
characterized as “an impediment” governed by Article 79, 
satisfying its enumerated conditions.  In case of an economic 
hardship, such as where a dramatic and unexpected rise in the costs 
of performance radically changes the equilibrium of the contract, it 
is often advocated that the performance needs to be “excessively 
                                                          
95 Id. ¶ 460, at 350. 
96 See, e.g., Scott D. Slater, Overcome by Hardship: The Inapplicability 
of The Unidroit Principles’ Hardship Provisions to CISG, 12 FLA. J. INT’L L. 
231, 259-60 (1998). 
97 AC Opinion, supra note 71, cmt. 30. 
98 See generally CISG, supra note 1. 
99 Barry Nicholas, Force Majeure and Frustration, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 
231, 232 (1979), https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/nicholas.html. 
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(extremely) onerous” to justify judicial relief.100  However, for the 
same reasons as not to define the “hardship” situations, it would be 
better not to introduce another criterion apart from the letters of 
Article 79.  This author believes that the “reasonable expectation 
test” concerning overcoming an impediment can play the same role 
as the standard of extreme onerousness (i.e., whether a failing 
party could reasonably be expected to have overcome the 
impediment). 
 
Generally speaking, the performance in the so-called 
“hardship” situations is physically possible (or not totally and 
definitively impossible), albeit it is very difficult, and, therefore, 
according to the conventional view of Article 79, the promisor 
cannot be exempted from his obligation to perform.  This is why a 
proposal, which would have allowed for the adaptation or 
termination of contract, was made during the review of the draft, 
and why the Advisory Council Opinion No.7 insinuates the 
possibility of the adaptation of contract under Article 79.101 
However, under our new theory, specific performance claims are 
precluded if a “hardship” case meets the conditions of Article 79. 
B. The Sunken Ship Case 
The first case that epitomizes a hardship situation is a 
salvage case.   
 
Seller agreed to sell and Buyer agreed to buy a picture 
painted by an artist, who had died 5 years before.  The ship 
transporting it has sunk together with the picture, but fortunately 
the picture itself remains intact in the hold of the ship.  The price 
                                                          
100 See, e.g., AC Opinion, supra note 71, op. 3.1; ATAMER, supra note 
15, ¶ 81, at 1090. 
101 AC Opinion, supra note 71, cmt. 40 (“CISG Article 79(5) may be 
relied upon to open up the possibility for a court or arbitral tribunal to determine 
what is owed to each other, thus ‘adapting’ the terms of the contract to the 
changed circumstances.”).  
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of the picture is 55 thousand dollars, but the costs of salvage are 
enormous.  Buyer sues Seller for specific performance.  
 
Because under our new theory Article 79 exempts a failing 
party from his obligation to perform if he encounters a qualified 
impediment, the conclusion that Seller is not required to salvage 
the ship can be reached by the simple application of the letters of 
Article 79(1).  It can be easily acknowledged that the sinking of the 
ship carrying the goods is “an impediment beyond [Seller’s] 
control.”102  It can also be admitted that “he could not reasonably 
be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract.”103  The OED defines the phrase 
to “take into account” as “to take into consideration as an existing 
element, to notice.”104  Ordinarily, parties to a sales contract do not 
take into consideration the possibility that the ship carrying the 
goods will sink as a factor which must be embodied in their 
contract.  In the words of our analysis, they do not “assume” that 
the ship will sink, or they share a tacit assumption that the ship will 
not sink.  Therefore, they do not bother to arrange for the 
catastrophe, because it will cost them time and trouble, which are 
most likely doomed to be wasted.  If they really believe the ship is 
likely to sink, they will never make a contract involving the ship.   
 
Of course, everything could be foreseeable and expected, 
including a prophecy that “a meteorite might strike our ship,” in 
the sense that we could not conclusively assert that it will never 
happen in the future.  It is a matter of a degree of probability.  In 
the business world, there are many sophisticated contracts 
containing elaborate clauses for mishaps.  However, as far as such 
a clause is concerned, such risks are beyond the scope of the CISG, 
                                                          
102  CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1). Professor Atamer states that “to 
exempt the obligor, the impediment has to be an objective one, having its roots 
outside the sphere of influence of the obligor.” ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 47, at 
1072.  
103 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1). 
104 Take into account, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
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which begins to function where the parties fail to agree.105  
Therefore, what is relevant here is the reasonable expectation of 
those who have not specifically agreed on the matter.  In this 
hypothetical, a “reasonable person” could not expect Seller to have 
taken the impediment into account.  So long as Seller could not 
have taken the sinking ship into account, a “reasonable person” 
could not have expected Seller to have avoided it or its 
consequences.106 No one could be expected to avoid what is 
unforeseeable and unlikely. 
 
The remaining part of Article 79(1)—“could not 
reasonably be expected to . . . overcome it or its 
consequences”107—is vital for the solution to this case.  One of the 
consequences is the extreme difficulty of salvaging the ship and 
rescuing the painting from it.  On the issue of whether Seller is 
required to carry out such an enterprise, this author agrees with 
Professor Lindström when he writes: 
 
Routamo and Ramberg point out that 
absolute impossibility cannot be a 
requirement for exemption but that 
the question is what a party 
reasonably can overcome. As an 
example, the scholars state that it 
cannot be regarded as reasonable to 
require a party to save a plane that 
lays 100 meters below sea 
level.  Such an impediment would be 
possible to overcome but the 
                                                          
105 CISG, supra note 1, art. 6. (“The parties may exclude the 
application of this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the 
effect of any of its provisions.”). 
106 There may be some cases where a failing party could not reasonably 
be expected to have taken an impediment into account, but could reasonably be 
expected to have avoided its consequence. For example, a seller can avoid a 
consequence of the sky-rocketed price of an input for his products by obtaining 
substitute materials or by ensuring price stability using futures or options. 
107 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1). 
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scholars regard such an operation as 
unreasonably expensive. . . .  The 
wording of Article 79 does not 
suggest that a party would be obliged 
to take on extraordinary 
responsibilities in order to perform. 
On the contrary, if the word 
“reasonably” in Article 79 also 
regards the obligation to overcome 
the impediment, Article 79 only 
obligates a party to make a 
reasonable effort to perform.108  
Rescuing the painting may be technically possible, but 
Seller must bear huge costs totally disproportionate to the price of 
the painting, and will suffer a financial loss that is significantly 
greater than the risk of loss that a “reasonable person” could expect 
Seller to have undertaken.109  It can also be regarded as an 
“economically irrational behavior”110 to force Seller to salvage the 
ship.  Therefore, a “reasonable person” could not expect him to 
overcome such a difficulty.  Thus, all of the conditions of Article 
                                                          
108 Lindström, supra note 90, at 13 (emphasis added). 
109 Professor Eisenberg has advanced a test called the “bounded-risk 
test,” under which “a promisor should be entitled to judicial relief if as a result 
of a dramatic and unexpected rise in costs, performance would result in a 
financial loss significantly greater than the risk of loss that the parties would 
reasonably have expected the promisor to have undertaken.” See Eisenberg, 
supra note 81, at 234. 
110 Professor Atamer is also standing on the premise that Article 79 
admits a specific performance claim but considers a claim for an “economically 
irrational behavior” as an exception, insisting that “[w]henever there is a blatant 
disproportion between the changed costs of performance and the interest of the 
buyer in receiving performance in kind，the seller ought to have the right to 
refuse a performance claim. What has to be done is a cost-benefit analysis. Each 
time one comes to the result that a claim for specific performance would be 
vexatious，the seller should have a defense.” ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 36, at 
1068. 
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79(1) are met.  Accordingly, Seller is exempted from his obligation 
to perform and from Buyer’s claim for damages.111   
C. The Devalued Currency Case and Adaptation by the Reasonable 
Expectation Test 
The second so-called “hardship” case is a devalued 
currency case.  
 
Buyer, domiciled in State X, concluded a contract of sale 
with Seller, domiciled in State Y.  Payment was agreed to be made 
in State Z within three months, upon delivery of the goods, in the 
currency of State Z (Z currency).  The price was 50,000 in Z 
currency.  Its value was equivalent to approximately 30 kilograms 
of gold.  Suppose further that within a month of the conclusion of 
the contract an unpredictable political and economic crisis, which 
the parties could not have reasonably taken into account, led to a 
massive devaluation of 50% of Z currency.  This has caused the 
value of the contract price to plunge by half.  Now the value of 
50,000 in Z currency has become equivalent to no more than 
approximately 15 kilograms of gold.  As a result of this totally 
unanticipated and massive devaluation of the Z currency, the sale 
has turned out to be a huge windfall for Buyer and a gross loss for 
Seller.112 
The performance by Seller, i.e., to procure the goods and 
deliver them to Buyer, is as possible as ever without any physical 
obstacle.  Because of the massive devaluation of Z currency, 
                                                          
111 Of course, as Professor Tallon points out, “the final solution will not 
be the same if the said object is a highly valuable sculpture or merely a machine 
tool. Thus, everything is a question of measure.” A sculpture made by Auguste 
Rodin would be worth salvage. In case of a machine tool, even if specially made 
according to the specifications by Buyer, the cost of making another may not be 
so high as to warrant salvage, and may be something Seller is “reasonably 
expected to overcome.” See Tallon, supra note 16, ¶ 2.6.4, at 582.   
112 This hypothetical case is based on the example in AC Opinion, 
supra note 71, cmt. 33. In the Comment, “buyer A” is probably misprinted for 
“seller B” and vice versa. 
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however, the transaction has become impracticable for Seller as it 
would cause him a substantial financial loss if he were forced to 
carry it out.  When we apply Article 79 to this case, the economy 
of State Z was “beyond control” for Seller as much as it was for 
anybody else.  The economic crisis that triggered the devaluation 
was unpredictable by definition.  Hence, the parties shared a tacit 
assumption that Z currency would be stable at least during the life 
of their contract.  Accordingly, Seller “could not reasonably be 
expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided [it].”113 
 
So far, there is an inclination to exempt Seller.  However, it 
would not be reasonable for both parties to put an end to their deal.  
Seller, as well as Buyer, may not be happy with this ending.  Let’s 
consider what the best solution that a “reasonable person” can 
come up with is.  A “reasonable person” in Buyer’s shoes might 
simply forgo the windfall, thinking that he has not borne 
comparable quid pro quo.114  If so, it is likely that he would like the 
transaction to stay on if he can obtain the profit that he had 
originally contemplated.  On the other hand, Seller would also 
most likely want the deal to continue if he can glean the proceeds 
of the sale which he had originally attempted to earn.  Z currency 
in their original undertaking was worth double of that after the 
devaluation.  It would be reasonable for them to agree to modify 
their contract by increasing the price to 100,000 in new Z 
currency—the equivalent of 50,000 in old Z currency.  If Seller 
simply eludes the contract, he must search for a bargain with 
another buyer from scratch, on terms which may or may not be 
more favorable than the eluded contract.  Buyer, on the other hand, 
must procure the goods from another seller on terms which may or 
                                                          
113 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1); see AC Opinion, supra note 71, cmt. 
39 (“Indeed, the theoretical possibility of such radical and unexpected changes 
admits the application of Article 79 in those rare instances as the one 
exemplified above.”). 
114 Of course, an actual breathing party will insist on the performance 
of the contract to the letter, trying to obtain the windfall, but as explained later in 
this section, this should be blocked.  
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may not be more favorable.  In addition, negotiating for and 
concluding a new contact with other dealers would most likely take 
more time and trouble than the rearrangement of the contract 
already consolidated.  
 
This is probably the most practical and reasonable solution, 
which will give both parties what they have wanted from the 
beginning, no more and no less.  A judge deciding such a case 
could reach this solution partly through Article 8(1), which 
provides: “[f]or the purposes of this Convention statements made 
by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to 
his intent where the other party knew or could not have been 
unaware what that intent was.”115  A superb illustration by 
Professor Farnworth is pertinent to our current discussion:  
One consequence of paragraph (1) 
[of Article 8] is that if the parties 
shared a common understanding of 
the meaning of language or other 
conduct, that understanding will 
prevail. . . .  If, for example, a seller 
agrees with a buyer to show a price 
of 50,000 in the contract, rather than 
the true price of 100,000, in order to 
reduce the broker’s fees, their 
contract will be interpreted according 
to their common understanding, 
                                                          
115 CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(1). 
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100,000 not 50,000.116  
In our hypothetical, both parties agreed that Seller’s 
performance was worth 50,000 in old Z currency or approximately 
30 kilograms of gold, and intended to sell and buy it at that fixed 
valuation.  Each “knew or could not have been unaware” of the 
other’s intent.  After the devaluation, the rate of 50,000 Z currency 
has plummeted down to the equivalent of approximately 15 
kilograms of gold.  Therefore, in order to maintain the originally 
intended value of the performance, the contract price must be 
increased to 100,000 in new Z currency.  If they had foreseen the 
devaluation and addressed the issue at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract, they would probably have agreed on this sum.117  
 
The interpretation of the parties’ intent must be linked to 
the “reasonable expectation test” of Article 79(1), because, as 
Professor Farnsworth’s exemplar shows, an Article 8(1) case does 
not usually involve an unexpected impediment.  Allowing Buyer to 
pay only 50,000 in new Z currency is unreasonable and unfair 
because it is not what the parties really intended, and because it is a 
sheer windfall to Buyer and a substantial financial loss to Seller.  
                                                          
116 E. Allen Farnsworth, Interpretation of Contract: Article 8, in C.M. 
BIANCA ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 
VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 95, 98 (1987); see also United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, [1978] IX Y.B. Comm’n on Int’l 
Trade 97, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1978; see also BGH Nov. 27, 2007, X ZR 
111/04, translated in Albert H. Kritzer CISG Database, CISG Case 
Presentation, PACE L. SCH. INST. INT’L COM. L., 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071127g1.html (last updated June 6, 2013) 
(The case concerns a buyer who proposed to the seller price increases to prevent 
buyer’s customers from finding out actual cost price. The price increment was to 
be skimmed off and transferred to a company affiliated with the buyer as 
“consulting and marketing fees.” The German Court held pursuant to Article 
8(1) of the CISG that the real intent of the price amendment proposed by the 
buyer was known to the seller, or the latter could not have been unaware of it.). 
117 Professor Eisenberg rightly pointed out that “unspecified terms are 
usually determined on the basis of what the contracting parties probably would 
have agreed to if they had addressed the relevant issue.” See Eisenberg, supra 
note 81, at 214. 
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Therefore, Seller “could not reasonably be expected to overcome 
the impediment”118 by performing the contract to the letter.  
However, he should not be exempted, because he could reasonably 
overcome the impediment by the solution mentioned above by 
applying Article 8(1).  Buyer, who may persist in obtaining the 
goods at half the price, may reject this solution.  However, if he 
does reject, the court will hold that Seller is exempted from 
performance, because a “reasonable person” could not expect 
Seller to overcome the impediment by accepting the payment 
which has only half the value of the original contract.  If Seller is 
exempted, Buyer must obtain the goods from the market probably 
at roughly the same price fixed in the court order. 
 
To order Buyer to pay 100,000 instead of 50,000 in Z 
currency is the same solution as adaptation of the contract, at least 
as far as its face value is concerned.  Unlike the UNIDROIT 
Principles, the CISG has no provision that authorizes a judge to 
adapt the contract.  However, such adaptation should be possible 
through the interpretation of the “reasonable expectation test” of 
Article 79, as demonstrated above.  Whether a party could 
reasonably be expected to overcome an impediment, in other 
words, whether a “reasonable person” could expect a party to 
overcome an impediment, is ultimately determined by a judge 
presiding over the case.  By this capacity of an umpire of 
reasonableness, a judge can adapt a contract by ordering a solution 
reasonably expected to be taken.  
 
It is impracticable and even a waste of time to order the 
parties to renegotiate, because it is likely that they had already 
negotiated extensively before going to court. 
D. The Drastic Price Increase Case and the “Eisenberg Formula” 
On September 1, Buyer and Seller had entered into a sales 
contract of certain type of steel tubes, which were to be used by 
                                                          
118 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1). 
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Buyer to make scaffolding, at the price of 100,000 Euro.  On 
September 30, the price of steel materials used for manufacturing 
the tubes increased by 70%.  Seller suspended performance and 
did not deliver the tubes, but instead asked Buyer for an 
adjustment to the price.  When negotiations failed, Seller declared 
that he would not make deliveries unless Buyer agreed to price 
increase.  Buyer did not agree and sought a court order requiring 
Seller to make deliveries at the price specified in the contract of 
100,000 Euro.119 
 
It is clear that the rise of steel price is “beyond control” of 
Seller, as well as anybody else.  However, it is not so clear whether 
Seller “could not reasonably be expected to have taken [it] into 
account at the time of the conclusion of the contract.”120  Our 
“reasonable expectation test” inquires whether a “reasonable 
person” in Seller’s shoes could expect Seller to have taken the 
price hike into account.  If the answer is affirmative—in other 
words, if the price increase stays within the reasonably expected 
level—he is liable for specific performance or expectation 
damages.  However, the scale of a reasonably expected price 
increase will sway widely depending on many, or probably 
infinite, variables, such as whether the transaction is of speculative 
nature, whether the goods are steel or farm products, whether the 
life of contract is long, or whether a proper market forecast is 
available.  In some speculative trades, parties might foresee a 70% 
price increase or even more.  Pinpointing the percentage that is 
uniformly applicable to all sorts of transactions in a reasonable 
manner is impossible.  If the matter is “left to the discretion of the 
                                                          
119 This hypothetical is based on Hof van Cassatie [Cass.] [Court of 
Cassation], June 19, 2009, C.07.0289.N, 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1457 (Belg.), translated in Albert H. 
Kritzer CISG Database, CISG Case Presentation, PACE L. SCH. INST. INT’L 
COM. L., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090619b1.html (last updated June 
25, 2012). Professor Flechtner rightly criticized this opinion as wrongfully 
incorporating the UNIDROIT Principles into the general principles of the 
CISG. See Flechtner, supra note 3, at 91-99. 
120 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1). 
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courts,”121 judges will be at a loss.  Professor Eisenberg, however, 
has found a solution:   
 
What constitutes a reasonably 
foreseeable increase in the seller’s 
cost of performance should be 
historically based; more specifically, 
it should be the maximum 
percentage increase in the cost of the 
relevant inputs over a comparable 
stretch of time during a reasonable 
past period.  In most cases, 
consideration of price movements 
during the prior ten to twenty years 
probably would suffice.122 
This author calls this test the “Eisenberg Formula.”  It is far 
more rational and versatile than any fixed static percentage, often 
discussed under the name of “limit of sacrifice.”123  It is rational 
because it sophisticates crude statements concerning risk-bearing, 
for example, an argument that sellers in speculative businesses are 
regarded as bearing the risk of fluctuations.  The “Eisenberg 
Formula” refines those statements and provides a rational answer 
to the question of when and how much a party should bear the risk.  
It is versatile because it can be applied to all kinds of transactions 
                                                          
121 ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 82, at 1090. 
122 Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 245. 
123 See, e.g., ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 82, at 1090; see also 
CHRISTOPH BRUNNER, FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP UNDER GENERAL 
CONTRACT PRINCIPLES: EXEMPTION OF NON-PERFORMANCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
428-38 (Kluwer L. Int’l. 2009) (suggesting that, as a general point of reference, 
100% increase is favored); see also Schwenzer, supra note 89, at 715-17 
(arguing that a 150-200 % margin is advisable, taking account of the 
international character of the transaction). Note that the concept of limit of 
sacrifice is related not only to the phase of “taking account of the impediment,” 
but also to the phase of “overcoming it,” which will be discussed in the rest of 
this article.  
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with equal validity, regardless of their kinds, natures, lengths, or 
the types of goods.  
 
In applying the “Eisenberg Formula” to the present 
hypothetical, we must research the fluctuation of the market prices 
of steel materials used for producing the tubes during the ten to 
twenty years before the conclusion of the contract, and identify the 
maximum percentage of price increase “over a comparable stretch 
of time,” that is, one month—from September 1 to September 30.  
Let’s assume that the maximum percentage of steel price increase 
in a month during the past ten years is 90%.  Thus, the 70% 
increase that took place in the hypothetical is below that 
percentage and, therefore, a “reasonable person” could expect 
Seller to have taken the price spike into account.  One critical 
condition of Article 79(1) is not met.124  Accordingly, Seller is not 
exempted and is obliged to perform the contract to the letter, or 
pay expectation damages to Buyer.125  It is notable that the 70% 
increase of the cost that Seller is ordered to bear is still below the 
reasonably expected level, i.e., 90%. 
 
On the other hand, if 70% is beyond the maximum 
percentage of the “Eisenberg Formula,” for example 50%, a 
“reasonable person” could not expect Seller to have taken a 70% 
increase into account.  However, this does not exempt Seller yet, 
because we must further ask whether he “could reasonably be 
expected to . . . overcome an impediment,”126 even where he could 
not reasonably be expected to have taken it into account at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract.  This is the logical reading of 
Article 79(1), because even if an impediment beyond control was 
not taken into account, Seller still could do something to overcome 
its consequences after it happened to him.  The consequence to 
                                                          
124 All of the conditions enumerated in Article 79(1) must be fulfilled 
for the exemption to apply. 
125 This would not be a windfall for Buyer, because in this hypothetical 
Buyer himself uses the tubes delivered by Seller or must obtain them from the 
market at the higher price. 
126 CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1). 
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overcome is a 70% increase in the cost of the steel materials.  It is 
true that if Seller decides to bear all the increase, he could certainly 
overcome it.  However, needless to say, the question is whether he 
could reasonably be expected to. 
 
Let’s assume that the market price of the tubes of the same 
type has increased127 by about 45%.128  One simple solution would 
be complete exemption of Seller, because the steel price increase 
(70%) is above the reasonably expected level (50%).  In this case, 
he would sell the tubes in the market at the price approximately 
45% higher than the contract price, and probably make some 
profit.  On the other hand, Buyer would have to buy the tubes from 
the market at the price approximately 45% higher than the contract 
price.  This solution imposes all the increased cost on Buyer and 
none on Seller.  At the other end of the scale is the solution that 
Seller bears all the increases.  Unlike the hypothetical of the 
                                                          
127 Professor Eisenberg explains: “Cases in which the seller’s cost of 
performance unexpectedly rises above the contract price often, perhaps usually, 
involve a cost increase that is market-wide. In such cases, the increase normally 
will raise not only the seller’s costs but also the buyer’s value for, and the 
market value of, the contracted-for commodity.” See Eisenberg, supra note 81, 
at 238 (emphasis added). Criticizing his bounded-risk test, Professor Goldberg 
writes about cases where the rise of the input cost was not correlated with the 
price increase of the product. This may be so, especially where the input and/or 
product have substitute goods, and there may a time-lag between the price 
increase of inputs and final products. Professor Eisenberg, however, states 
“often, perhaps usually.”  In order to legitimately refute his rationale, Professor 
Goldberg must prove that it is unusual that an unexpected rise of the seller’s cost 
of performance should involve a market-wide price increase. It does not seem 
that he has proved it. See Victor Goldberg, Excuse Doctrine: The Eisenberg 
Uncertainty Principle, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 359, 369-78 (2010). 
128 The original market price of the tubes includes other costs than steel 
materials and the profit. A 70% rise of the price of steel materials does not 
usually lead to a 70% rise of the tube price. In addition, the sellers may reduce 
their profit to make the changed price more acceptable to the buyers at the time 
of abrupt price hike. In actual cases, the market price of the product will usually 
increase at lower rate than 70%. As such, the hypothetical’s rate is set to 45%. 
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sunken ship above, this is not an “event-oriented”129 case, and 
there is no need for “all or nothing” approach.  What is required 
here is a numerical determination in the graduation of successive 
figures.  The word “reasonable” has affinity with a question of 
degree: where to draw the dividing line in the gamut of the 
continuum of increase.  Seller should bear the extra cost to the 
extent of the maximum price increase percentage identified by the 
“Eisenberg Formula,” namely to 50%, which is what he could 
reasonably be expected to have taken into account.  Seller should 
give up any profit included in the original contract price.  Because 
even if Seller bears 50%, Buyer must also bear some portion of the 
increase, and a “reasonable person” could not expect Seller to 
make profit in sacrifice of Buyer.  A hypothetical rough calculation 
of the sums that each party must bear can be made in the following 
manner.  The original contract price of 100,000 Euro includes 
70,000 for steel materials, 20,000 for other costs, and 10,000 for 
profit.  A 70% increase of steel price makes the contract price go 
up to 149,000 ([70,000×1.7]＋20,000＋10,000).  Seller bears the 
cost of 50% increase of steel price, which is 35,000 (70,000×0.5), 
and other costs. Seller also must give up his profit.  So Seller’s 
total cost is 125,000 Euro (70,000＋35,000＋20,000).  On the 
other hand, Buyer must bear the cost of 20% (70%－50%) increase 
of steel price and other costs.  So Buyer must pay 104,000 Euro 
([70,000×1.2]＋20,000), which is 4,000 Euro more than the 
original price. Seller suffers a loss of 21,000 Euro.  
 
If Buyer persists in paying no more than the contract price 
of 100,000 Euro, Seller would be obliged to incur more loss than 
he could reasonably be expected to bear, and, therefore, would be 
                                                          
129 See Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 241. (“Typical shared-assumption 
cases are event-oriented, in the sense that the issue is whether the occurrence of 
a discrete event entitles the adversely affected party to judicial relief. If it does, 
then usually the relief should consist of an excuse of that party’s obligation to 
perform, although in some cases the relief may consist only of excusing liability 
for expectation damages. In contrast, the typical bounded-risk case is 
magnitude-oriented, in the sense that the issue is whether the adversely affected 
party’s dramatically increased cost of performance entitles it to judicial relief.”)  
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exempted, which means Buyer would have to obtain the goods in 
the market, probably at a price 45% higher than the original price, 
or 41,000 Euro ([100,000×1.45]－104,000) more than the 
modified price. 
 
On the other hand, Seller may not be allowed to leave the 
courtroom free from the contract with some prospect to make 
profit by selling to another, simply because the price spike is above 
his reasonable expectation.  This is what the word “overcome” 
implies. 
VI. JUDGES’ CAPACITY TO ADAPT THE CONTRACT UNDER THE CISG 
Professor Schlechtriem once dared to state:  
 
But if you ask me whether there is 
somewhere in the Convention the 
principle of adjustment or adaptation 
of contracts, I would put forward a 
very provoking argument.  I think 
the remedy of price reduction in 
Article 50 of the Convention is a 
kind of adjustment of the contract to 
reflect a disturbed balance between 
performance on one side and 
obligation on the other side.  The 
defects in goods, or nonconformities 
on the goods, constitute a 
disturbance of the equilibrium or 
balance of the exchanged 
performances. That is why we 
defended price reduction -- as a just 
instrument for adjusting the 
disturbed balance of 
performances. . . .  [Y]ou could use 
this principle as a springboard to 
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develop a general rule of adjustment 
in hardship cases.130 
 
There has always been antagonism to “a judge rewriting 
our contract,” and probably there will be similar hostility to 
adaptation through the “reasonable expectation test.”  However, it 
is the very function of the CISG to interpret and supplement what 
parties have expressly agreed to.  In this sense, a judge applying 
the CISG always rewrites or supplements a contract.  This is all the 
more true of the provisions with the word “reasonable” in their 
texts.  For example, Article 39(1) provides: “The buyer loses the 
right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not 
give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of 
conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or 
ought to have discovered it.”131  If in a case involving a 40-day 
delay of notice of a non-conformity, a judge holds that a 
“reasonable time” of Article 39(1) is within one month and denies 
the buyer’s claim for damages, he is practically adding in the 
contract a clause providing: “The buyer shall lose his right to claim 
concerning any non-conformity if he fails to notify the seller of it 
within one month.”132 
 
Another example is Article 60, which uses a phrase similar 
to Article 79(1): “The buyer’s obligation to take delivery consists: 
(a) in doing all the acts which could reasonably be expected of him 
                                                          
130 Harry M. Flechtner, Transcript of a Workshop on the Sales 
Convention: Leading CISG Scholars Discuss Contract Formation, Validity, 
Excuse for Hardship, Avoidance, Nachfrist, Contract Interpretation, Parol 
Evidence, Analogical Application, and Much More, 18 J. L. & Com. 191, 238 
(1999). 
131 CISG, supra note 1, art. 39(1). 
132 See Ingeborg Schwenzer, The Noble Month (Articles 38, 39 CISG)--
The Story Behind the Scenery, 7 EUR. J. L. REFORM, 353-66 (2006); see also 
Ishida, supra note 57, at 8-15 (arguing that if the buyer’s notice of non-
compliance is made to the seller within a month, it is presumed to be made 
within a reasonable time under Article 39(1), and that the presumption can be 
rebutted by the seller proving a prejudice caused by the delay). 
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in order to enable the seller to make delivery.”133  In a China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
(“CIETAC”) case which applied Article 60(a), it was held that the 
buyer was reasonably expected to dispense with an inspection not 
specified in the contract and to send a ship to the loading place.134  
What this award did is no less than modifying the contract. 
 
A court sometimes even vindicates the existence of a 
contract by utilizing the “reasonable person” standard of Article 
8(2).  When a party negates the existence of a binding contract, the 
court, by pointing at certain conducts of his, concludes that “a 
reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have . 
. . in the same circumstances”135 understood the conducts as 
making a binding contract.  In one case, a Switzerland district 
court found that the conclusion of the contract, the buyer’s 
intention to be bound, and the definite quantity of goods to be sold 
could be deduced from the buyer’s request to the seller to issue an 
invoice for goods already delivered.136  This case suggests that a 
court sometimes “writes” a contract. 
 
Taking account of these extensive powers granted to judges 
by the CISG, it would not be a deviation from the language of the 
Convention for them to adapt the contract based on the “reasonable 
expectation test” of Article 79(1), particularly when they deal with 
an unexpected skyrocketing price beyond once-in-decade increase.  
It far better serves the integrity of the CISG than resorting to other 
laws, such as the UNIDROIT Principles.  It might be their duty to 
make adaptation within the realm of interpretation of the CISG 
under the command of Article 7(1) “to promote uniformity in its 
                                                          
133 CISG, supra note 1, art. 60. 
134 Mung Bean Case, CISG/2001/02, China International Economic & 
Trade Arbitration Commission [CIETAC] (PRC) (Mar. 22, 2001), translated in 
Albert H. Kritzer CISG Database, CISG Case Presentation, PACE L. SCH. INST. 
INT’L COM. L., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010322c1.html (last updated 
Oct. 22, 2010).  
135 CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(2). 
136 Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] July 3, 1997, 125 
Entscheidungen des schweizerischen Bundesgerichts [BGE] I 96 (Switz.). 
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application and the observance of good faith in international 
trade.”137  
VII. CONCLUSION 
This article has demonstrated following three theses. 
 
First, Article 79 exempts a failing party from his obligation 
to perform.  This is the most natural interpretation of Article 79, 
and the contrary conventional views have impliedly acknowledged 
it.  This author earnestly hopes that a judge applying Article 79 
will not have a hard time reaching the conclusion that it exempts 
performance.  This author also wishes that in the future, a judge 
could simply and straightforwardly hold: “It is one of the basic 
principles of Article 79 that specific performance claims are barred 
if the conditions enumerated in paragraph (1) are satisfied.” 
Second, in a case where a dramatic and unexpected rise in 
the costs of performance radically changes the equilibrium of the 
contract, the extent of reasonably expected increase should be 
determined by the “Eisenberg Formula,” which identifies the 
maximum percentage increase in the cost of the relevant inputs 
over a comparable stretch of time during the prior ten to twenty 
years.138  If the actual increase is below the maximum level, the 
seller is not exempted, and is obliged to perform or to pay 
expectation damages to the buyer.  If it is beyond the maximum 
level, the seller is expected and hence obliged to overcome the 
increase by bearing the cost up to the level. 
Third, it is business as usual for judges to rewrite, adapt, or 
supplement a contract.  Although the CISG has no provision 
explicitly authorizing a judge to do so, Article 79 itself 
presupposes such capacities of a judge.  A judge can adapt a 
contract through the interpretation of the reasonable expectation 
expressly incorporated in Article 79(1).  In the future, in solving a 
                                                          
137 CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1). 
138 Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 245. 
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so-called “hardship” case, he should never invoke the domestic law 
of his state, nor resort to such other soft laws as the UNIDROIT 
Principles.  He is recommended to straightforwardly hold: “The 
contracts governed by Article 79 of the CISG can be adapted or 
modified through the interpretation of the reasonable expectation 
provided therein.” 
The author wishes this article would save time for judges 
presiding over Article 79 cases, who might not be very familiar 
with the Convention, and who could not spare sufficient time for a 
case, overwhelmed by caseloads.  This author also sincerely hopes 
that legal scholars of the CISG all over the world will acknowledge 
that Article 79 allows for adaptation or modification of contracts.  
It has been thirty years since the CISG took effect, and it is high 
time the controversies—“sound and fury”—over the “hardship” 
situations and adaptation of contracts were settled. 
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